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Cook Islands
On the eve of celebrating half a cen-
tury of constitutional self-governing in 
the Cook Islands, the period in review 
was dominated by the aftermath of 
the July 2014 general election. This 
included nine court petitions, two 
by-elections, and one defection. The 
results saw the Cook Islands Party 
return to power with a one-seat major-
ity to lead the country for the remain-
der of the four-year parliamentary 
term. Public voices were raised and 
rallied during the year under review. A 
key area of concern included marine 
resource management and purse-seine 
fishing. Along with preparations for 
the celebrations of fifty years of inde-
pendence, the relationship of the Cook 
Islands with New Zealand came under 
scrutiny. Eyebrows were raised over 
the Cook Islands’ interest in pursuing 
United Nations (UN) membership. 
The portability of the New Zealand 
Superannuation for Cook Islander 
residents in New Zealand also stirred 
interest. Both of the latter issues 
highlighted the fact that the Cook 
Islands can certainly be heard but not 
necessarily heeded in the domestic 
and international policy spaces of its 
sovereign partner and colonial master, 
New Zealand. 
Electoral uncertainty pervaded the 
year. In order to form a government, a 
political party needs 12 of the 24 par-
liamentary seats. The general election 
saw fifty-four candidates, including 
seven women, contest the twenty-four 
constituencies. The preliminary results 
had the Democratic Party ahead with 
11 seats, the Cook Islands Party with 
10 seats, and the One Cook Islands 
Party with 2 seats. The Tamarua seat 
of the island of Mangaia was tied.
Counting of special and postal 
votes saw the final results swing to 
give the Cook Islands Party 13 seats. 
The Democratic Party losses included 
the defeat of their leader, Wilkie Ras-
mussen from the island of Penrhyn. 
The Mitiaro Island seat was also tied. 
Of course, matters did not end 
there, with nine petitions lodged in 
court. Three petitions were with-
drawn, with the remaining heard by 
the court. Petition dismissals saw 
Nandi Glassie and first-timer Rose 
Toki Brown survive petitions alleging 
bribery. They took up office as Cook 
Islands Party representatives for the 
Island of Atiu (cin, 18 Sept 2014). The 
petition concerning the Manihiki seat 
held by Prime Minister Henry Puna 
was also dismissed following claims 
of bribery and unqualified voters 
(cin, 10 Sept 2015). The Tamarua seat 
petition based on voter ineligibility 
was proved. This enabled the seat to 
be secured by Tetangi Matapo as the 
third female Member of Parliament 
for the Democratic Party, following a 
recount. 
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By this stage of the proceedings, 
Finance Minister Mark Brown called 
for electoral reforms, as a number of 
petitions were based on voter ineligi-
bility. He advocated the “establish-
ment of a fulltime electoral office and 
chief registrar” (Pacific Scoop, 28 Sept 
2014). By October 2014, the Cook 
Islands Party held a one-seat majority 
as it awaited the outcome of the court 
action to decide on the Mitiaro draw 
and a Vaipae-Tautu petition. 
The tied Mitiaro result of 50 votes 
each saw the Democratic Party first 
lodging in court a petition claiming 
bribery and treating in the run-up to 
the election and then withdrawing the 
petition. In November, this late with-
drawal was successfully appealed by 
the Cook Islands Party. On hearing the 
matter, Chief Justice Thomas Weston 
deemed one voter ineligible. The 
subsequent recount saw long- serving 
Democratic Party member Tangata 
Vavia receive 50 votes, just ahead of 
Tuakeu Tangatapoto’s 49 votes. In 
December, High Court Judge Hugh 
Williams dismissed the Cook Islands 
Party challenge over the eligibility of 
three voters, thereby upholding the 
recent recount results. Not content 
to let this result lie, the Cook Islands 
Party unsuccessfully took the mat-
ter to the Court of Appeal in New 
Zealand, as one voter had chosen to 
leave Mitiaro for medical reasons (cin, 
18 Feb 2015). Once all petitions had 
been heard in December, the Cook 
Islands Party had 11 seats, the Demo-
cratic Party had 10, One Cook Islands 
Party had 2 seats, and a by-election 
was ordered for the Aitutaki electorate 
of Vaipae-Tautu. 
Sadly, February 2015 saw the 
 unexpected passing of Democratic 
Party candidate Kete Ioane. In the 
midst of his campaign for the Vaipae-
Tautu by-election, Ioane, age sixty-
four, died in New Zealand following 
a short illness. He was known as a 
quiet achiever and humble man whose 
organizational skills brought many 
projects to fruition. He was consid-
ered a man of the people and for the 
people. His career as a Member of 
Parliament began in 1999. His port-
folios included Environment, National 
Heritage, House of Ariki, Parliamen-
tary  Services, and the Outer Islands 
(cin, 16 Feb 2015). 
As many mourned Ioane’s passing, 
a new date for the by-election was set 
for 31 March 2015. Previously the 
Democratic Party–One Cook Islands 
Party coalition had Teina Bishop 
acting as Ioane’s campaign manager. 
However, instead of supporting Kete 
Ioane’s replacement, the One Cook 
Islands Party named retired school 
principal Amiria Davey as its candi-
date. Davey had originally been in 
the running to be the new Democratic 
Party candidate (cin, 4 March 2015). 
In honor of her husband, Teinakore 
Ioane was named the Democratic 
Party candidate to stand against Davey 
and the Cook Islands Party candidate, 
Mona Ioane. This inclusion of a third 
candidate gave an inkling that all was 
not well in the Democratic Party camp 
or in its coalition with the One Cook 
Islands Party. 
Unfortunately the Democratic Party 
suffered yet another loss. Despite his 
win as a Democratic Party candidate 
for the Avatiu-Ruatonga-Palmerston 
electorate, first time Member of Par-
liament Albert Nicholas then crossed 
the floor to join the Cook Islands 
Party. This one seat shift took the 
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Cook Islands Party numbers from 11 
to 12, giving it enough to form a gov-
ernment. Enticed by a seat in cabinet, 
Nicholas now held portfolios includ-
ing Internal Affairs, Ombudsman, 
Youth and Sports, and the govern-
ment-managed marketplace in Avatiu, 
the Punanga Nui. 
Nicholas’s party hop had been two 
months in the planning. He considered 
this move as representing a coalition 
between his constituency commit-
tee, the Cook Islands Party, and the 
people of his constituency. In addition 
to being an arrangement that would 
benefit the constituency, he believed 
that he was “doing this in the hope 
that it gives political certainty to our 
country” (cin, 25 March 2015). This 
sentiment was shared by Prime Min-
ister Puna. Of course this was not the 
view of the Democratic Party, which 
condemned Nicholas for his actions. 
Under the anti–party hopping provi-
sion of the 2004 Electoral Act, Mem-
bers of Parliament who switch parties 
cannot vote on matters of appro-
priation or confidence in the prime 
minister. This effectively means that if 
Nicholas votes to support the govern-
ment on such matters, his seat can be 
declared vacant, forcing yet another 
by-election (cin, 16 March 2015). 
However, no such opportunities 
arose. Days after Nicholas’s move, the 
Aitutaki by-election saw Cook Islands 
Party candidate Mona Ioane voted 
back in. The remaining votes were 
split between Davey and Teinakore 
Ioane. The win gave the Cook Islands 
Party a thirteen-seat majority and the 
ability to govern unencumbered. 
Despite the win, all is not settled 
for the troubled seat of Vaipae-Tautu. 
After initially winning the seat in the 
general election, former policeman 
and lawyer Mona Ioane was accused 
of bribery in December 2014. The 
matter was referred to the police com-
missioner for investigation, and the 
election result was declared void. At 
the time, Ioane had been appointed 
as the cabinet minister for Educa-
tion, Justice, and Marine Resources; 
however, Prime Minister Puna consid-
ered it improper to bestow a cabinet 
seat on Ioane while the case was under 
police investigation (cin, 27 April 
2015). By the end of the period under 
review, no charges had been laid. If 
charged and then found guilty, Ioane 
would have to vacate his seat and a 
by-election would have to be held. 
A second police investigation of 
a political leader also remains unre-
solved. The corruption investigation 
of Aitutaki Member of Parliament 
Teina Bishop continues to linger 
into its second year. Since July 2013, 
investigators have continued to look 
into allegations of bribery and cor-
ruption leveled against Bishop when 
he was minister of Marine Resources. 
Included in the investigation are 
his relations with Huanan Fishery 
(Cook Islands) Company, a subsidiary 
of Luen Thai Fishing Venture. No 
charges have been filed in connection 
with the long-running investigation, 
and Bishop has frequently expressed 
his exasperation at the delays in 
bringing the matter to a close (cin, 
16 March 2015). As with Ioane, if he 
is charged and then found guilty, he 
will also have to vacate his seat and 
another by-election must be held. 
Overall, the results have shown that 
all has not gone well for the Demo-
cratic Party, despite its retaining the 
confidence of the majority of Cook 
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Islands voters. In departing from his 
seat and role as party leader, Wilkie 
Rasmussen called for a new gover-
nance model that better suits our type 
of small island state, like the democ-
racy in Jersey, United Kingdom, where 
members are independent with no 
political parties, the queen is head of 
state, and the government is split with 
12 senators, 12 constables, and 29 
deputies. Rightsizing Parliament with 
seats based on quality and merit rather 
than quantity was also advanced (cin, 
24 Jan 2015). With William “Smiley” 
Heather appointed as the Democratic 
Party leader and Ngatangiia rookie 
Member of Parliament Tama Tuavera 
named deputy leader, there has been 
no indication that such a transforma-
tion has found favor with the new-
look party or with the Cook Islands 
Party as it gets on with serving out 
the remainder of its four-year term in 
power. 
Besides electoral politics, the year 
under review also saw attention 
focused on the fiftieth anniversary of 
independence. All kinds of events have 
been planned for a year of consti-
tutional celebrations. A New Year’s 
Day music festival was already held 
but much is centered on the annual 
constitutional anniversary, to be held 
on 4 August 2015. This will include 
the participation of each island at 
national cultural and sporting events 
as well as commemorative services to 
be attended by local and international 
supporters of the country. 
The annual Development Partners 
meeting held in February 2015 and 
themed “Journey to Development” 
was attended by a number of interna-
tional partners. The weeklong meeting 
provided an opportunity for the gov-
ernment and its development partners 
to consider the country’s progress and 
commitments to the country’ develop-
ment agenda. This included making 
“island sense” of development with 
increased use of national systems in 
addressing the ongoing challenges of 
depopulation, a fragile environment, 
and limited economic base. Also dur-
ing February, the University of the 
South Pacific and the Office of the 
Prime Minister convened a series of 
climate-change fora aimed at building 
awareness about its potential impacts. 
Well supported by local individuals 
and organizations, the fora drew on 
the substantial knowledge and experi-
ence of Cook Islands experts. 
During the year, government atten-
tion continued to focus on climate 
finance as a potential resource for the 
Cook Islands development agenda. 
Over the medium term, the Cook 
Islands as a middle-income country 
will no longer be eligible for develop-
ment assistance from the Organisation 
of Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment. Officials have set their sights 
on accessing potential climate finance 
through global funds such as the 
Adaptation Fund and the new Global 
Climate Fund with us$10 billion in 
pledges. Globally, the Adaptation 
Fund has over us$265 million dollars 
allocated for forty-four countries to 
increase climate resilience. However, 
of the seventeen national implement-
ing agencies already accredited, none 
are from the Pacific. In order to be 
accredited, the Cook Islands Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Manage-
ment made an application to the 
Adaptation Fund board to become 
a National Implementing Entity. 
According to ministry official Lavinia 
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Tama, if successful, the Cook Islands 
will be able to move funds directly 
into government systems. This will 
do away with the middleman and the 
ticket clipping that currently happens 
with funds managed by third-party 
organizations (cin, 15 Dec 2014). 
The Cook Islands–style sovereignty 
of free association with New Zealand 
also came into focus this year. While 
it was reported that the New Zealand 
government was not looking to change 
the existing relationship, media claims 
surfaced that the Cook Islands “was 
pushing for independence from New 
Zealand at the cost of losing New 
Zealand citizenship” (cin, 10 June 
2015). However, it would seem that 
the interest was actually in obtaining 
a seat as a member state of the United 
Nations, without necessarily losing 
New Zealand citizenship. 
Over the last fifty years, the Cook 
Islands has shown its ability to act like 
an independent state. It has estab-
lished diplomatic relations with forty-
three states and is a member of over 
forty-two organizations, including 
United Nations specialized agencies. It 
has also signed more than two hun-
dred multilateral and bilateral treaties 
(Cook Islands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Immigration 2015). UN 
membership was considered by the 
prime minister’s chief advisor, Trevor 
Pitt, to be a natural progression for a 
maturing country and to have more 
to do with diplomatic competency to 
participate in international affairs than 
with obtaining aid (cin, 30 June 2015; 
Stuff, 31 May 2015). The current 
government, like previous ones, has 
yet to apply for UN membership, so 
the Cook Islands’ eligibility remains 
unresolved (Igarashi 2001). 
The nature of Cook Islands sover-
eignty was also highlighted this year 
in its ability to present its views on 
New Zealand domestic policy issues 
that cross international borders. One 
such issue was the eligibility and 
portability of superannuation pay-
ments from Cook Islanders back 
to the Cook Islands on their retire-
ment. Prime Minister Puna presented 
the Cook Islands case to the Social 
Services Select Committee on the 
Social Assistance bill. Currently Cook 
Islanders are required to live in New 
Zealand for five years after the age 
of fifty to be qualifying residents for 
Superannuation. The Cook Islands, 
along with Niue, sought the removal 
of this requirement. The Cook Islands 
submitted that an amendment would 
enable the earlier return of Cook 
Islanders as well as prevent the 
negative impacts experienced by some 
Cook Islanders having to return to 
New Zealand to qualify. 
Noting the issue of depopulation 
(Cook Islands Government 2011), 
high levels of human mobility, and the 
changing demographics of the Cook 
Islands population, such a submission 
can be seen as addressing  ongoing 
challenges associated with the econo-
mies of “large ocean-states” (Stone 
2012). Furthermore, the Cook Islands 
submission highlighted the Cook 
Islands’ place in the “realm” of New 
Zealand (whereby the Cook Islands, 
with its agreement with New Zealand, 
shares the queen of the British Com-
monwealth as head of state) and the 
existing principle whereby foreigners 
are able to qualify for New Zealand 
citizenship by maintaining five years’ 
residency in the Cook Islands. As 
such, this principle could be applied 
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to the New Zealand Superannuation 
with the five-year requirement also 
fulfilling the qualifying requirements 
(cin, 23 Feb 2015). The Cook Islands 
call to amend the social assistance bill 
gained support from New Zealand 
Parliamentarians such as Winston 
Peters and Cook Islands descendant 
Poto Williams, Labour Member of 
Parliament for Christchurch East (cin, 
2 May 2015). In the end, the New 
Zealand Parliament passed the bill 
without the changes. 
Civic actions were stirred with 
public opposition to the issue of 
overfishing. Purse-seine fishing and 
fish-aggregation devices are believed 
to have resulted in the reduced access 
to fish stocks for subsistence fish-
ers and game-charter fisheries (cin, 
16 April 2015). In April 2015, more 
than one hundred protestors took to 
the main street of Avarua, Rarotonga, 
calling for a total ban on purse-seine 
fishing in Cook Islands waters. In 
May, a long-awaited meeting was held 
with the prime minister and Secretary 
of the Ministry of Marine Resources 
Ben Ponia and representatives of Te 
Ipukarea Society (tis). In representing 
the environmental group leading the 
lobby for fishery reforms, tis Presi-
dent Ian Karika and technical direc-
tor Kelvin Passfield were able to put 
their side of the debate to the prime 
minister. However, any possibility of 
a ban must contend with Secretary 
Ponia’s view that “we are dealing with 
a regional fishery and if we wish for it 
to be managed responsibly, our chal-
lenge is to engage with industry and 
other Pacific Islands and not simply 
disengage and demonise fishing” (cin, 
27 April 2015). 
Further action in the anti–purse-
seining campaign saw a petition initi-
ated. Four thousand signatures were 
collected from across the country. As 
a first for Te Ipukarea Society, the 
petition has gained a lot of support, 
although this was not the case on the 
island of Aitutaki. The Island Council 
there would not allow the petition 
to be placed in major stores on the 
island, thereby limiting opportuni-
ties; and only 20 percent of the voting 
public’s signatures were gathered 
(cin, 9 June 2015). The petition was 
presented to Parliament during the 
June 2015 sitting, which was the first 
since October 2014 when Parliament 
passed the budget. Democratic Party 
Member of Parliament for Murienua 
James Beer undertook to table the 
petition and ensure that the concerns 
of the campaign were dealt with in 
Parliament.
The long-awaited family law 
reforms took one step closer to 
becoming reality. The Family Law Bill 
has inched through the lawmaking 
processes with its second hearing. A 
select committee chaired by Member 
of Parliament Mona Ioane has been 
established. The legislation intends 
to modernize laws related to divorce, 
child support, parenting arrangements, 
domestic violence, and the care and 
protection of children (cin, 29 June 
2015). However, its progress is seen as 
frustratingly slow by those who tire-
lessly advocate against family violence 
and provide support to victims of 
domestic violence (cin, 29 May 2015). 
Let’s hope the public outcries afforded 
political, economic, and environmen-
tal concerns can be equally invoked 
when it comes time to make public 
submissions to the select committee. 
Overall, the Cook Islands has 
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 managed to get through its election-
year controversies despite two by-elec-
tions still possibly in the cards. With 
the fifty-year sovereignty celebrations 
now underway, it is likely that further 
political disruptions will be pushed to 
the backburner until all celebrations 
have been completed. 
christina newport
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French Polynesia
Politics in French Polynesia during the 
year under review was dominated by a 
profound leadership struggle between 
veteran politician Gaston Flosse, who 
lost his position as president of the 
country, and his successor and former 
son-in-law Edouard Fritch, who suc-
cessfully freed himself from his former 
mentor’s overbearing influence. Yet it 
came at the price of breaking up the 
solid majority arising from the 2013 
election and throwing the country into 
a new period of political instability. 
It all started in July 2014, when the 
French justice system finally started 
catching up with Flosse’s various cases 
of corruption after decades of ineffec-
tive handling. On 23 July, the Paris 
Court of Cassation, a court that exam-
ines prior cases for procedural errors, 
confirmed a previous criminal convic-
tion that Flosse had first appealed, to 
no avail, and then re-appealed. While 
the court suspended Flosse’s jail sen-
tence, it confirmed a fine of 125,000 
euros (us$138,000) as well as a depri-
vation of his civil rights. The president 
was thus legally barred from voting or 
serving in an elected office for a period 
of three years (ti, 23 July 2014). 
The substance of the charges was 
the so-called fictional employment 
affair, going back to the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, when various politi-
cians and trade union leaders had 
been given paid jobs at the presidential 
office without ever working there, a 
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scheme of corruption popular among 
French politicians. 
Under normal circumstances, Flosse 
would immediately have been noti-
fied of the final sentence and removed 
from office. However, his lawyers 
tried to use any and every means to 
evade the sentence, first by asking 
yet another court to reexamine the 
sentence; second by filing a complaint 
with the European Human Rights 
Court (if either court would rule in 
Flosse’s favor, it would lead to a sus-
pension of his sentence); and finally by 
petitioning French President François 
Hollande for a presidential pardon (ti, 
23 July 2014).
As a matter of procedure, French 
High Commissioner Lionel Beffre was 
notified of the sentence and tasked 
with enforcing it by formally declar-
ing Flosse ineligible and therefore 
removed from office. However, Beffre 
first refused to do so, arguing, on 
shaky legal grounds, that the demand 
for a presidential pardon had to be 
heard first. This was interpreted as 
an indication that Flosse’s protective 
network was still operational. It was 
indeed unheard of that a convicted 
criminal, whose conviction has been 
confirmed for a third time, could 
evade his sentence simply by asking 
for a presidential pardon. The more 
usual procedure would be that a par-
don would be pronounced afterward 
and might, for instance, lead to an 
early release from jail or, in Flosse’s 
case, might reinstate his civil rights 
earlier than originally intended. 
The high commissioner’s stalling 
tactics scandalized the local opposi-
tion. Opposition Union Pour La 
Démocratie (upld) leader and former 
President Oscar Temaru argued that 
Beffre’s behavior undermined the rule 
of law, stating that with this prec-
edent, all convicted criminals could 
now refuse to accept their sentences by 
asking Hollande for a presidential par-
don (ti, 29 July 2014). Similarly, Teva 
Rohfritsch of the small pro-French 
opposition party A Tia Porinetia (atp) 
expressed being “shocked” at what 
he perceived as a plot by the French 
government to protect Flosse (rnzi, 
6 Aug 2014).
While still acting as though the 
confirmed conviction did not exist, 
Flosse undertook at least one positive 
step when he dismissed the controver-
sial former French overseas minister, 
Brigitte Girardin, from her position as 
the country’s “special representative 
in Paris,” admitting that the post was 
superfluous (ti, 6 Aug 2014)—a fact 
that had been pointed out numerous 
times before by the opposition and by 
independent observers.
Later in August, President Hol-
lande commented on the pardon 
petition, stating ambiguously that 
“the decisions of the Judiciary should 
be applied” (ti, 23 Aug 2014). Beffre 
interpreted this as a refusal of Flosse’s 
demand and at last initiated Flosse’s 
removal from office. On 6 Septem-
ber, the president was thus declared 
removed by decree of the high com-
missioner and prohibited from holding 
any political office for the next three 
years (dt, 6 Sept 2014). 
With Flosse’s party Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira holding a two-thirds 
majority in the Assembly of French 
Polynesia, there were initially no 
surprises in managing Flosse’s succes-
sion. Following Flosse’s directions, his 
former son-in-law, Assembly Speaker 
Edouard Fritch, was elected to the 
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country’s presidency on 12 September 
(tpm, Oct 2014). Unlike Flosse the 
year before, Fritch was able to gather 
an ultra-majority of 46 votes (out of 
a total of 57 assembly members) since 
the atp caucus supported the new 
president. This seemingly confirmed 
rumors already spread during the 
2013 elections that, despite its opposi-
tion rhetoric, atp was nothing but a 
“fifth column” of Tahoeraa. Fritch’s 
new cabinet remained for the most 
part identical to that of his predeces-
sor, with Nuihau Laurey continuing as 
vice president. Former cabinet minister 
and Flosse confidant Marcel Tuihani 
succeeded Fritch as assembly Speaker 
(ti, 15 Sept, 16 Sept 2014). 
Having thus barely been removed 
from local politics, Flosse reentered 
it a few weeks later through the back 
door when on 26 September the 
Tahoeraa assembly caucus hired him 
as “special consultant” and placed a 
luxury office in the assembly building 
at his disposal using a legal loophole, 
since his conviction forbade the hold-
ing of an elected office but not a job as 
an employee of a political institution 
(ti, 26 Sept 2014). As Flosse appar-
ently continued to exercise significant 
influence over the government, many 
people asked the question, reiter-
ated on the October cover of Tahiti-
Pacifique Magazine next to a picture 
of Flosse and Fritch, “Who is the real 
president?” (tpm, Oct 2014).
As a consequence of the confirmed 
conviction, Flosse also lost his seat in 
the French senate, which he had held 
since 1998. This was rather a formal-
ity, however, since the term expired at 
the end of September and Flosse had 
not planned to run for another term. 
The senatorial election of 28 Sep-
tember—which is done indirectly by 
an electoral college of 714, consisting 
of the territory’s three French national 
assembly members, the 57 members 
of the assembly of French Polynesia, 
and delegates from all 48 municipal 
councils—was won as anticipated by 
the Tahoeraa ticket consisting of Iriti 
Teura and Vincent Dubois, the latter 
being another son-in-law of Flosse. 
Since several Tahoeraa electors had 
worn their party colors during the 
vote, which is prohibited under French 
law, upld filed a complaint demand-
ing an annulment of the election 
results (tpm, Oct 2014). 
Senator Richard Tuheiava of upld, 
who had been elected as Flosse’s ticket 
mate when Tahoeraa and upld were 
allied in 2008, missed being reelected. 
The pro-independence opposition thus 
lost an important voice in Paris, as 
Tuheiava had been a very active advo-
cate of the territory’s decolonization, 
both nationally and internationally, 
and it was mainly thanks to his efforts 
that the country won reinscription as 
a non–self-governing territory by con-
sensual decision of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 2013. In various 
follow-up meetings of the decoloniza-
tion committee and other UN agen-
cies, Tuheiava had always been present 
to represent the pro-independence sec-
tion of the country’s population, often 
in tandem with ex-President Temaru. 
In early July, Tuheiava had first 
attended the UN Decolonization Com-
mittee meeting in New York, where 
he testified, together with Temaru, 
in favor of more UN scrutiny over 
France’s administration of the territory 
(otr, 1 July, 2 July 2014); he then 
represented the territory at a meeting 
of the Parliamentarians for Nuclear 
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Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
in Switzerland, where he delivered a 
speech calling for the nuclear powers 
to take up their responsibilities for the 
people victimized by their thousands 
of atomic weapons tests, including 
France in French Polynesia between 
1966 and 1996 (otr, 20 July 2014).
Shortly thereafter, on 25 July, the 
UN secretary-general released the 
long-awaited report on the effects of 
nuclear testing in French Polynesia 
that had been announced in a previ-
ous General Assembly resolution 
of December 2013. The report was 
rather a disappointment, as it did not 
contain any new research but instead 
only summarized old reports on the 
topic, including one by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency from 
1998 that is heavily biased toward the 
then official French position that the 
tests were “entirely harmless” and a 
more recent one by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights that is gener-
ally critical of nuclear weapons and 
admits heavy health impacts deriving 
from test explosions (United Nations 
2014b). References to the detailed 
reports produced by French Polynesia 
government agencies during Temaru’s 
five presidencies were not included. 
Despite this disappointment, the fact 
alone that negative health impacts of 
nuclear testing are now part of the 
official UN record pertaining to the 
territory should be seen as a step in 
the right direction. 
Losing his senate seat did not dis-
courage Tuheiava from continuing his 
UN decolonization work, as he and 
Temaru once more went to New York 
to address the General Assembly’s 
Fourth Committee in October (otr, 
22 Oct 2014). Partly influenced by 
their testimony, the General Assembly 
passed another resolution on French 
Polynesia on 5 December, in which it 
once more denounced France’s lack of 
cooperation with UN decolonization 
agencies —including Paris’s continu-
ing refusal to submit information on 
the territory as is obligatory under 
article 73e of the UN Charter—and 
reaffirmed its call for the French and 
territorial governments to collaborate 
with UN agencies in educating the 
people of the country about their right 
to self-determination (United Nations 
2014a).
Meanwhile, at home, the ongo-
ing UN debate on decolonization 
and nuclear testing effects was hav-
ing unforeseen and profound impacts 
on local politics. Once locked out of 
the presidency, Gaston Flosse, who 
as recently as June 2014 had insulted 
significant sections of the population 
by ordering the removal of the monu-
ment commemorating the nuclear-test 
victims from a prominent position 
in a Papeete seafront park, suddenly 
rediscovered his anticolonialism. Fol-
lowing Hollande’s refusal to grant him 
a pardon, Flosse first publicly pro-
claimed that he felt entitled to such a 
pardon because he had served French 
national interests by supporting the 
nuclear-testing program. Then, to 
protest against the way he was treated, 
he returned his Legion of Honor 
medal (the highest order of merit of 
the French Republic) in an open letter 
to Hollande, whom he blamed person-
ally for his removal from office (tpm, 
Oct 2014). From then on, Flosse’s 
discourse turned increasingly hostile 
toward the French government, to the 
point of rhetorically outdoing upld. 
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The release of the UN report, as 
weak as it was in substance, helped 
to put the plight of former test work-
ers suffering from radiation-caused 
illnesses back in the headlines. The 
so-called Morin Act of 2010 that 
provides compensation for health 
damages caused by nuclear testing 
has been largely ineffective, since 
only fourteen individuals have as yet 
received compensation under its terms. 
A new version of the law that suppos-
edly facilitates compensation claims 
was passed in 2013 but was only 
enacted by decree of French Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls on 15 Septem-
ber 2014, and nuclear-testing victims’ 
association Moruroa e Tatou spokes-
person Roland Oldham stated that he 
was doubtful whether the new version 
would be any more effective than its 
predecessor (ti, 17 Sept 2014). 
Meanwhile, Flosse, through his 
protégé Tuihani, had discovered the 
nuclear issue as a new warhorse. In 
mid-October, President Fritch trav-
eled to Paris on his own and met with 
French government officials to obtain 
new funds for the permanently bank-
rupt territorial government without 
coordinating these efforts with Flosse 
beforehand (tpm, Nov 2014). Flosse 
felt bypassed, and the display of good 
relations with Paris by his successor 
added insult to injury. By November, 
tensions among Flosse, Tuihani, and 
the majority of Tahoeraa assembly 
members on one hand and Fritch and 
his cabinet on the other, had reached 
such heights that Flosse was ready to 
topple his successor and break up the 
party. 
On 21 November, Tuihani thus 
introduced a resolution asking France 
to pay the territory compensation for 
the environmental damage caused by 
the tests, in addition to the yearly lease 
plus interest for the land on which 
the testing facilities were built, which 
France had never paid. In total, the 
resolution asked for 90.4 billion cfp 
francs (us$900 million). Unrealistic 
as the demands were in substance, 
Flosse’s political goal was to intro-
duce a resolution in line with upld’s 
anticolonial rhetoric that would be 
too tempting for Temaru and his sup-
porters not to vote for, while his own 
Tahoeraa members would be forced 
to vote for it out of loyalty. The plan 
worked; on 27 November the reso-
lution was adopted with a majority 
composed of 25 Tahoeraa members as 
well as the entire upld caucus, while 
11 Tahoeraa members (those loyal 
to Fritch) and members of atp voted 
against. To increase pressure on Paris, 
Senator Iriti Teura, another Flosse 
loyalist within Tahoeraa, introduced 
a written question to the French 
government that was identical to the 
assembly resolution. High Commis-
sioner Beffre called the resolution 
an “unfriendly gesture” toward the 
French state (tpm, Dec 2014). 
Flosse had thus reached his first 
goal of severely annoying Paris in a 
spirit of revenge for his dismissal. His 
second goal—to create a new major-
ity out of his Tahoeraa loyalists and 
upld based on a common anticolo-
nial rhetoric (as he had already done 
in 2007–2008) in order to topple 
Fritch—was more difficult to reach, as 
Temaru was not ready to commit to 
such an alliance. 
In late December, Flosse was 
offered another opportunity to sideline 
Fritch when a pay raise for the presi-
dent came up in the assembly’s finance 
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committee. In 2013, Flosse had his 
presidential salary cut in half due to a 
new French law limiting the salary a 
senator could receive for local political 
offices held concurrently. This had the 
effect of having the president paid only 
380,100 cfp francs (about us$3,500) 
per month, while his cabinet ministers 
were paid 680,580 cfp francs (about 
us$6,300). Not being paid a senator’s 
salary concurrently, Fritch considered 
this situation unjust. While the Taho-
eraa majority in the committee, likely 
on Flosse’s directives, voted against 
the pay raise, upld refused to vote 
with them, arguing that Fritch was 
justified in being paid the same as his 
ministers (ti, 18 Dec, 19 Dec 2014). 
The fact that upld supported the 
president against Flosse was the first 
indication that Flosse’s plan to forge 
an alliance with upld was indeed not 
working. Barely two months later, 
the assembly’s permanent commit-
tee voted unanimously to adjust the 
president’s salary as originally planned 
(ti, 5 Feb 2014). 
While at first glance the salary 
adjustment appears a just cause, it was 
in fact symptomatic of the country’s 
political elite living in a luxury world 
completely disconnected from the 
common people. Instead of “adjust-
ing” Fritch’s salary to that of his 
ministers, it would have been far more 
useful to “adjust” their salaries to the 
2013 level of the president’s salary, 
which is clearly no small amount. Fur-
thermore, the argument that, unlike 
Flosse before, Fritch had to survive on 
the “meager” presidential salary alone 
was also flawed, since Fritch, while 
not a senator, still concurrently holds 
a second salaried office as mayor of 
Pirae and would thus have earned 
more than enough even if the presiden-
tial salary had been kept at the lower 
level. Lastly, the fact that upld, as a 
supposedly anticolonial party working 
toward establishing a sovereign coun-
try not dependent on French subsidies, 
evidently supports extravagant elite 
salaries that the country could never 
afford if it were independent sheds a 
bad light on the party’s credibility. 
That Flosse was by no means more 
principled and insisted on auster-
ity in this case only in order to score 
off Fritch became clear when the 
ex-president and his partner Pascale 
Haiti were arrested and detained on 
12 December on charges of theft of 
public goods after being accused of 
having taken custom-made china and 
silverware from the presidential palace 
to their private home (rnzi, 12 Dec 
2014). Apparently, since Flosse was 
unable to ally with Temaru to over-
throw Fritch, he could at least humili-
ate him by blocking his pay raise and 
leaving him without the luxury presi-
dential dishes and silverware, while 
symbolically maintaining a “presiden-
tial” lifestyle for himself.
For a few months, the situation 
remained calm, but on 29  January, 
Tuihani introduced a proposal to 
amend the organic law of French 
Polynesia, including an increase in 
the country government’s preroga-
tives as well as a passage allowing 
a nonmember of the assembly to be 
elected president. This was clearly 
meant to enable Flosse to regain the 
presidency while his rights to vote or 
run for office remained suspended, 
and it led to severe criticism not only 
by the opposition parties but also by 
pro-Fritch members of Tahoeraa (ti, 
29 Jan, 30 Jan 2015). 
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Tensions between Flosse and 
Fritch further increased when, on 
6 February, the French Constitutional 
Council ruled in favor of the opposi-
tion’s complaints from September 
and declared the senatorial election 
invalid. As a consequence, Senators 
Teura and Dubois were removed from 
office and a by-election was called for 
May (dt, 6 Feb 2015). Flosse immedi-
ately assembled the Tahoeraa steering 
committee to have Teura and Dubois 
reconfirmed as senatorial candidates, 
while Fritch, seeing the upcoming 
election as a chance to increase his 
own power, suggested Vice President 
Laurey and assembly member Lana 
Tetuanui as candidates. A meeting 
on 20 February between Flosse and 
Fritch, who had not personally com-
municated since September, was held 
only to put a good face on the matter 
and did nothing to ease their steadily 
deteriorating relationship (ti, 20 Feb 
2015; tpm, March 2015).
The assembly session of 2 April 
became another test for the chang-
ing political majorities. The assembly 
voted to accept a convention signed 
between Fritch and the French govern-
ment at the end of the previous year, 
under which the French state would 
financially contribute to the social 
solidarity scheme provided by the 
country government. upld voted with 
atp and 16 Fritch supporters for the 
resolution, giving it a strong majority 
of 35 votes (ti, 2 April 2015). Once 
again Flosse’s strategy to use upld to 
form an antigovernment majority with 
his Tahoeraa loyalists had failed. 
During the next few weeks, Flosse 
attempted to strengthen his influence 
by using a heavy-handed approach 
toward party discipline. Insisting on 
a strict application of Tahoeraa’s by-
laws, an extraordinary meeting of the 
steering committee expelled Laurey 
and Tetuanui from the party because 
they refused to comply with orders 
to withdraw from the senatorial race 
and were thus considered running 
on an opposing ticket. This was later 
 formally confirmed by the party lead-
ership (tpm, May 2015). 
In early May, the split between 
the two factions of Tahoeraa became 
finalized. At the senatorial by-election 
of 3 May, the Laurey-Tetuanui ticket 
won a clear majority in the first round, 
as not only electors of the Fritch wing 
of Tahoeraa but also many atp and 
even some upld electors voted for 
them (ti, 3 May 2015). 
Strengthened by this clear verdict, 
Fritch and his supporters formed a 
new assembly caucus named Tapura 
Huiraatira (“People’s List”) on 
5 May. Fifteen assembly members 
joined the new group, while twenty-
three remained loyal to Tahoeraa. In 
coordination with the two opposition 
caucuses, the members of the vari-
ous assembly committees were newly 
constituted and filled proportionally 
(ti, 7 May 2015). Of Flosse’s loyalists, 
only Assembly Speaker Tuihani was 
able to hold on to his position, since 
the Organic Law of French Polynesia 
provides for the election of a new 
Speaker in between terms only in the 
case of the incumbent’s resignation. 
Of the five parliamentarians represent-
ing the country in Paris, only National 
Assembly member Jonas Tahuaitu 
remained loyal to Flosse, while, 
besides the two new senators, the two 
other National Assembly members, 
Maina Sage and Jean-Paul Tuaiva, 
were also supporters of Fritch. 
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A few days later, the Tahoeraa 
steering committee expelled all found-
ing members of the new caucus. Presi-
dent Fritch, on the other hand, was a 
more complicated case because he was 
last elected deputy leader of the party 
by a convention in 2014, an election 
that according to Tahoeraa’s by-laws 
can only be nullified by another party 
convention (ti, 12 May 2015). While 
Flosse repeatedly called on Fritch to 
resign, he refused to do so.
After a short period of stability of 
approximately two years, the country 
thus descended back into a political 
chaos without clear majorities. Instead 
of the two-thirds majority stemming 
from the May 2013 assembly elec-
tions, the president now only held a 
minority of fifteen members. Refer-
ring to the constant changes made 
in the electoral system in order to 
create stable majorities, to no avail, 
an observer commented sarcastically 
that “no matter what the French do to 
 create stability, our politicians manage 
to turn it into instability” (anony-
mous, pers comm, 25 June 2015).
With Fritch thus being a president 
without a majority, it came as little 
surprise that on 27 May he formed a 
coalition government with atp, whose 
pro-French, anti-Flosse platform is 
almost identical with his own, and atp 
leader Teva Rohfritsch joined the cabi-
net as minister for economic affairs 
(ti, 27 May 2015). 
The coalition with atp gave Fritch 
eight additional assembly members, 
but with twenty-three members total it 
is still a minority coalition and would 
need the support of either upld or 
Flosse’s “rump-Tahoeraa” to pass 
laws and resolutions. As a reconcilia-
tion between Fritch and Flosse seems 
increasingly unlikely, upld has thus 
become a courted party that tips the 
scale, forming ad hoc alliances with 
either the Tapura-atp government 
or the opposition Tahoeraa remnant 
depending on the circumstances. 
According to a local journalist, upld 
is thus enabled to play a “subtle game 
of liar’s poker” (ti, 3 July 2015).
While another switch in majori-
ties cannot be ruled out for the near 
future, Flosse’s plan to woo upld 
with anticolonial rhetoric into a 
permanent coalition and overthrow 
Fritch in a no-confidence motion has 
not worked out so far. Considering 
the political culture of the country and 
its dynamics, it appears a far more 
likely scenario that further Tahoeraa 
members will cross the floor if offered 
ministerial portfolios or other offices 
by Fritch. This already happened in 
early June, when another Tahoeraa 
member crossed over to join Tapura, 
increasing its strength to sixteen (ti, 
9 June 2015). 
Fritch—who like the other histori-
cal Flosse-dissident presidents, Alexan-
dre Léontieff and Gaston Tong Sang, 
is not as charismatic a leader as either 
Flosse or Temaru—clearly entered the 
presidency only by particular circum-
stances, and whether he will be able to 
maintain himself in the face of pos-
sible intrigues by others is far from 
sure. Whether Flosse, now 83 years 
old, will ever regain the presidency 
remains to be seen, but his longevity, 
both physically and politically, should 
not be underestimated, as so far he has 
returned in full force each and every 
time the end of his political career 
seemed imminent.
With the most able political leader 
a notoriously corrupt figure like Flosse 
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and with few emerging politicians with 
leadership qualities yet in sight, French 
Polynesia finds itself in a deep-seated 
leadership crisis. This can be observed 
not only in politics but in other fields 
as well, such as sports, where one of 
the saddest failures of leadership has 
occurred. Féderation Internationale 
du Football Association (fifa) official 
Reynald Temarii, former professional 
football player and then minister 
for sports and youth under Flosse in 
the early 2000s, became one of the 
few Tahitians ascending to a high-
profile international role when he was 
appointed fifa vice president a decade 
ago. However, being a true prod-
uct of the political system of French 
Polynesia, as an international sports 
official Temarii has done nothing 
but be involved in corruption affairs. 
In the latest fifa scandal about the 
bribes that attended the awarding of 
the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, Temarii 
was once more summoned and inter-
rogated as a major suspect and ended 
up being suspended from any associa-
tion football activities for eight years 
by the fifa ethics commission (ti, 13 
May, 30 May 2015; tpm, June 2015).
Leadership failures also became 
evident in the virtual inaction of gov-
ernment institutions in the face of the 
Chikungunya epidemic that ravaged 
the country during the review period. 
Imported from Africa via other French 
overseas territories, the mosquito-
borne disease was already affecting 
over 11,000 people in November (ti, 
21 Nov 2014). Efforts to curb the 
epidemic by eradicating the invasive 
mosquito species responsible for its 
spread were done only perfunctorily. 
By the end of the year, there were 
more than 130,000 cases (out of an 
overall population of 270,000 for the 
entire country) and 14 deaths (pir, 
9 Jan 2015).
The deaths included famed singer 
Barthélémy Arakino, who passed 
away on 16 February at the age of 
59 from Chikungunya-derived com-
plications (tpm, March 2015). Also 
among those who joined the ancestors 
during the review period were veteran 
pro-independence leader Tetua Mai 
of Huahine, who died at the age of 
76 (tpm, June 2015), as well as Papa 
Mape of Moorea (age 82) and Coco 
Elacott of Bora Bora (age 64), two 
prominent experts of Polynesian tradi-
tion and ancestral knowledge, which, 
unfortunately, is less frequently passed 
down to younger generations as time 
goes on (tpm, Dec 2014, Jan 2015).
What exactly the future will hold 
for the country seems less clear than 
ever, but the French colonial “moth-
erland” is so crisis affected itself that 
it appears increasingly unable to 
contribute to the territory’s economic 
development. If anything promising 
can be seen on the horizon in that 
sense, it will most likely be intensify-
ing economic relations with China. In 
early June, President Fritch, after hav-
ing consolidated his power base for 
the time being, visited various parts 
of China to negotiate investments 
in tourism and other industries (ti, 
4 June, 6 June 2015).
Meanwhile, two big projects 
financed with Chinese capital are 
already underway in the country. The 
first is the “Tahiti Nui Ocean Foods” 
complex on Hao Atoll in the Tuamotu 
Archipelago, a gigantic aquaculture 
farm to be funded through an invest-
ment contract of 150 billion cfp 
francs (us$1.5 billion) over fifteen 
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years by Chinese company Tian 
Rui International Investments, with 
construction officially inaugurated on 
6 May (tpm, June 2015).
Second, Flosse’s last big pet project, 
a large-scale tourism development 
also to be funded from China named 
“Mahana Beach” in Punaauia, is in 
its planning stages. The envisioned 
mega-complex of hotels and resorts 
is meant to imitate that of Waikīkī in 
Hawai‘i, and the construction design 
was awarded to the Honolulu-based 
architectural firm Group 70 Inter-
national. As it would surpass every-
thing ever built on Tahiti before and 
include for the first time high-rises 
and a casino (both currently illegal 
under local laws), tpm editor Alex Du 
Prel called it a “pharaonic project” 
(tpm, Aug 2014). upld denounced 
the project as being too costly as well 
as discriminatory to the local popula-
tion, as it is planned to suspend the 
local minimum wage on the construc-
tion site and bar local residents from 
visiting the casino (ti, 12 Sept 2014). 
Also, the  profitability of the project 
is still doubtful, since the tourism 
industry in the country has been gen-
erally failing due to cheaper and more 
efficient competition on the part of 
other Pacific destinations such as Fiji, 
the Cook Islands, and Sāmoa, and as 
a consequence, dozens of hotels have 
closed in French Polynesia during the 
past few years. 
In any case, the geopolitical reori-
entation of the Pacific Islands from the 
colonial and neocolonial West to East 
Asia and other emerging or reemerg-
ing non-Western powers such as India 
and Russia, as is most visibly articu-
lated by Fiji and its neighbors in the 
southwestern Pacific, is becoming evi-
dent in French Polynesia as well. With 
its weakened economy, France itself 
is unlikely to remain an important 
player in the region. While a few years 
ago there were unconfirmed rumors 
about the United States building a 
military installation on Mangareva 
in the east of the country (ti, 12 July 
2013), a recent move of the Teva I Uta 
municipality on Tahiti’s south coast 
to twin itself with the Russian town 
of  Kronstadt appears quite interesting 
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Hawaiian Issues 
This year has been a milestone for 
Native Hawaiians. New voices are 
emerging in the community, and the 
debate is no longer whether there will 
be a Hawaiian nation; the struggle 
now is over what form it will take. 
Key events included protests against 
the construction of new telescopes on 
Mauna Kea and Haleakalā, sev-
eral important new publications by 
Kanaka Maoli authors, and contro-
versial efforts toward nation building 
and federal recognition.
On day 68 of the ongoing vigil to 
protect Mauna Kea, Ku‘uipo Freitas, 
a student in the master’s program 
at Ka Haka ‘Ula O Ke‘elikōlani (the 
College of Hawaiian Language) at the 
University of Hawai‘i–Hilo and one of 
the young leaders of the vigil, wrote: 
“There’s a difference between protest-
ing (western perspective) and aloha 
‘āina (Hawaiian perspective). We love 
our ‘āina [land], our language, our 
culture, our keiki [children] and we 
will do whatever it takes to protect 
our future” (Freitas 2015). 
No‘eau Peralto is a scholar engaged 
in kuleana-based research and activ-
ism in Hāmākua on the island of 
Hawai‘i, his kulāiwi (homeland). “We 
are the Mauna,” he proclaimed, “and 
our treatment of it reflects a deeply 
ingrained notion of the ways in which 
we now view and treat ourselves and 
each other. In neglecting our kuleana 
to mālama this ‘āina [our responsibil-
ity to care for this land], we ultimately 
neglect our kuleana to the future 
generations of our lāhui [our nation]” 
(Peralto 2014, 241). 
Ku‘uipo and No‘eau are but two 
of the next generation of Native 
 Hawaiians raised in aloha ‘āina and 
well schooled in contemporary poli-
tics and traditional values. They arise 
out of a legacy of Native Hawaiian 
activism that was the Hawaiian cul-
tural and political renaissance of the 
latter half of the twentieth century. 
These children and grandchildren 
of the first aloha ‘āina warriors are 
showing up at rallies for Hawaiian 
independence, making impassioned 
pleas to the  trustees of the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs (oha) to stand with 
them in the struggle to regain control 
of Hawaiian lands, and, under the 
watchful eye of their kūpuna (elders), 
these young people are leading the 
movement to prevent construction of 
a thirty-meter telescope on Mauna 
Kea as well as the Daniel K Inouye 
Solar Telescope on Haleakalā. This 
review focuses on the resistance on 
Mauna Kea, but it must be noted that 
similar arguments are being made 
on both mountains concerning state 
stewardship of resources. (For more 
on the Haleakalā telescope project, 
see  Associated Press 2015; Cocke 
2013).
Much of the work of Native 
Hawaiian activism over the past 
sixty-five years is documented in 
A Nation Rising: Hawaiian Move-
ments for Life, Land, and Sovereignty 
(Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, Hussey, and 
Wright 2014). This book is one of 
a number of groundbreaking works 
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by Native Hawaiian scholars pub-
lished in 2014, including volumes by 
Kamanamaikalani Beamer, Katrina-
Ann Kapā Oliveira, Aiko Yamashiro 
and Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, and 
Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar. Collectively 
these works contribute to the growing 
body of scholarly works grounded in 
Native Hawaiian knowledge systems 
and beliefs. 
Through essays and photographs, 
A Nation Rising paints a vibrant and 
dynamic picture of the emergence 
and growth of the Hawaiian indepen-
dence movement. One of the major 
themes in the book is Native Hawai-
ian political activism to regain control 
of the Hawaiian Kingdom Crown and 
Government Lands, also known as the 
ceded lands. The contested sacred site, 
Mauna Kea, is included in this inven-
tory of lands. 
Another Native Hawaiian issue 
that has heated up this year is the 
real politik of building a Hawai-
ian nation. The US Department of 
the Interior (doi) and the State of 
Hawai‘i,  including the legislature, 
the governor’s office, and the semi-
autonomous state agency oha, have 
attempted to address the mechanics 
of nation building. oha, in conjunc-
tion with the state, stepped up efforts 
to create a roll of Native Hawaiians 
and to  organize a structure for Native 
Hawaiian governance. Meanwhile, the 
doi took initial steps toward federal 
recognition for Native Hawaiians 
through executive order. Hawaiian 
independence advocates are contest-
ing both these efforts, arguing that 
neither addresses a critical element of 
self-determination: control of one’s 
own lands and resources—for Native 
Hawaiians, that would be the Hawai-
ian Kingdom Crown and Government 
Lands. 
Many years ago, traditional naviga-
tor and former University of Hawai‘i 
Regent Nainoa Thompson made the 
connection between Mauna Kea and 
this larger issue of land and sover-
eignty: “Mauna Kea is the center of 
our spirituality. For it to be the place 
we debate this issue is not by chance,” 
he said in a Los Angeles Times article 
(McFarling 2001). 
The movement to protect Mauna 
Kea is arguably the Hawaiian issue 
that has garnered the most attention 
locally, nationally, and internationally 
in the past year. Although the dispute 
has reached a critical juncture this 
year, the presence of telescopes on the 
mauna has been contested for decades. 
The 2005 video Mauna Kea: Temple 
Under Siege documents early efforts to 
rein in development on the mountain 
(Lander and Puhipau 2005). In this 
film, defenders of Mauna Kea, includ-
ing a wide range of Native Hawai-
ians and allies, speak out against 
the desecration and environmental 
degradation of the mountain, mak-
ing cogent arguments about religious 
freedom and the responsibility to 
protect a fragile ecosystem. In the end, 
though, these voices were powerless 
against the economic and scientific 
interests that control land use on the 
mountain. The video ends with these 
words: “In 2004, for the first time 
in thirty-five years, nasa completed 
a study on cumulative impacts of 
astronomy development on Mauna 
Kea and found that the impact was 
significant and adverse. nasa and the 
University of Hawai‘i continue with 
plans for more astronomy develop-
ment” (Lander and Puhipau 2006; see 
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also Hawaii State Auditor 1998, 2005; 
Ho 2003; McFarling 2001).
In following years, the defenders of 
the mountain did thwart the expan-
sion of one telescope array on the 
mauna. In 2007, a group of petition-
ers successfully sued to overturn a 
Board of Land and Natural Resources 
(blnr) permit for additional tele-
scopes at the W M Keck Observatory. 
The judge’s ruling stated that the proj-
ect did not have an adequate manage-
ment plan in place. In 2011, this same 
group of petitioners entered into a 
contested case proceeding to challenge 
a Conservation District Use Permit 
granted to the University of Hawai‘i–
Hilo to build a thirty-meter telescope 
on Mauna Kea (Hawaii Independent 
Staff 2011; Casumbal-Salazar 2014, 
xxxi). The plaintiffs have taken this 
contested case to the Hawai‘i Supreme 
Court, and oral arguments are sched-
uled for 27 August 2015. 
tmt Observatory Corporation 
(tmt), an international consortium 
based in Pasadena, California, pro-
poses to build and operate the thirty-
meter telescope within the Mauna 
Kea Science Reserve. Advocates in 
the scientific community argue that 
this telescope is “an essential tool 
to address questions in astronomy 
ranging from understanding star and 
planet formation to unraveling the 
history of galaxies and the develop-
ment of large-scale structure in the 
universe” (Thirty Meter Telescope 
website 2015). Local supporters of the 
project argue that astronomy brings 
needed economic stimulus to West 
Hawai‘i Island (Ramones 2014). For 
Native Hawaiians, Mauna Kea is a 
wahi pana (storied place) and a sacred 
place. They argue that the astronomy 
community is not fulfilling its kuleana 
to protect sacred sites and fragile habi-
tats (Casumbal-Salazar 2014; Lander 
and Puhipau 2005). 
In 2014, contention between oppo-
nents and supporters of tmt heated 
up when tmt scheduled a ground-
breaking ceremony for the site despite 
ongoing litigation (Caron 2014). 
Native Hawaiians disrupted the cer-
emony, putting tmt, the University of 
Hawai‘i, and the blnr on notice that 
they would not allow the telescope 
project to move forward. In April and 
June 2015, operating under a strict 
discipline of kapu aloha (respectful, 
ritual restraint), demonstrators put 
their bodies in front of construction 
equipment on the mountain. 
Political debate on the development 
on Mauna Kea is closely tied to the 
question of control of lands and the 
shared sense that a grave injustice was 
perpetrated on the Hawaiian people 
in the aftermath of the 1893 coup that 
deposed Queen Lili‘uokalani. Many 
agree with former Governor John 
Waihe‘e’s observation: “I know very 
few Native Hawaiians who aren’t 
moved by the fact that the United 
States illegally took over Hawaii” 
(Bussewitz 2015). This fact of his-
tory, as Waihe‘e referred to the illegal 
 taking of Hawai‘i, has generated many 
possible ways to move forward as a 
Hawaiian nation. 
Hawai‘i’s congressional delega-
tion, led by US Senator Daniel Akaka, 
attempted to resolve the issue by 
means of federal legislation to rec-
ognize a Native Hawaiian governing 
entity. The Native Hawaiian Govern-
ment Reorganization Act, also known 
as the Akaka Bill, would create a 
nation-to-nation relationship between 
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the United States and the Native 
Hawaiian governing entity similar to 
that of Native American governing 
entities (Kauanui 2014, 313). Propo-
nents of the legislation argued that 
it would protect Native Hawaiian 
entitlement programs and foreclose 
the possibility of future lawsuits claim-
ing that these programs are race-based 
and therefore illegal. When it became 
clear that the US Congress would 
not enact the Akaka Bill, the State of 
Hawai‘i and the administration of US 
President Barack Obama embarked 
on different paths for recognition of 
Hawaiians as Native peoples within 
the United States. J Kēhaulani Kau-
anui has pointed out the limitations of 
either a state or a federal process for 
creating a Native Hawaiian govern-
ing entity. First, these processes would 
“undercut the restoration of the 
Hawaiian nation under international 
law” (Kauanui 2014, 312). The Native 
Hawaiian governing entity  created 
under either of these frameworks, 
Kaua nui also argued, would represent 
“a collective acquiescence [by Native 
Hawaiians] to the US government or 
its subsidiaries” (2014, 314).
The advantages and drawbacks of 
federal recognition (also referred to 
as a nation-within-a-nation, domestic 
dependency, or a tribal model) have 
been debated in the Native Hawai-
ian independence movement since its 
early days (Ka‘iama 2014; Kauanui 
2014; Bussewitz 2015). The summer 
of 2014, though, opened up the debate 
on these important issues of land and 
self-determination to a broader Native 
Hawaiian public. At the request of 
Hawai‘i’s congressional delegation as 
well as state politicians and leaders 
in the Hawaiian community, the doi 
held a series of meetings across the 
state and in Indian Country (Native 
American communities throughout 
the continental United States) for the 
expressed purpose to “solicit com-
ments that could help determine 
whether the Department develops a 
formal, administrative procedure for 
reestablishing an official government-
to-government relationship with the 
Native Hawaiian community and if 
so, what that procedure should be.” 
According to the doi, the purpose 
of such a relationship would be “to 
more effectively implement the special 
political and trust relationship” that 
currently exists between the federal 
government and the Native Hawaiian 
community (doi 2014a).
To the surprise of both establish-
ment and radical Hawaiian political 
leaders, thousands of Native Hawai-
ians attended the hearings. Entire 
families testified, sharing cross-genera-
tional stories of loss and of hope. The 
hearings were, it seemed, an opportu-
nity for the Hawaiian nation to speak 
to itself. Digital technology allowed 
the hearings to be streamed over the 
Internet via public-access community 
media organizations. Social networks 
lit up with conversations about what 
federal recognition or independence 
would mean for Hawaiians. The pre-
ponderance of oral testimony opposed 
federal recognition. The doi stated at 
the hearings that it will not pursue the 
rule-making process if the majority of 
both oral and written comments are 
opposed to the process. Transcripts of 
the hearings are available at the doi 
website (doi 2014b).
In August 2015, the doi press 
secretary had confirmed “that in 
response to an extensive public com-
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ment period with public meetings, as 
you are aware, in Hawaii and also 
Indian country in the continental 
United States and requests from con-
gressional states and Native Hawaiian 
community leaders, the Department of 
Interior will propose a rule that estab-
lishes an administrative procedure that 
the secretary would use if the Native 
Hawaiian community forms a unified 
government that seeks a formal gov-
ernment-to-government relationship 
with the United States” (Blair 2015). 
On 29 September 2015, the doi 
made public its proposed rules that 
would govern a relationship between 
the federal government and a Native 
Hawaiian governing entity (Hawaii 
News Now 2015). Events surrounding 
nation building and federal recogni-
tion are continually unfolding and 
will most certainly be reported in next 
year’s update.
The chairman of the Native Hawai-
ian Roll Commission, former Gover-
nor Waihe‘e, was reported as saying 
that “the effort [of the Department 
of the Interior] syncs nicely with the 
nation-building process overseen 
by the Native Hawaiian Roll Com-
mission” (Perez 2014). In 2011, the 
Hawai‘i State Legislature created 
Act 195, the Native Hawaiian Roll 
Commission, the purpose of which is 
“to provide for and to implement the 
recognition of the Native Hawaiian 
people by means and methods that 
will facilitate their self-governance, 
including the establishment of, or the 
amendment to, programs, entities, and 
other matters pursuant to law that 
relate, or affect ownership, possession, 
or use of lands by the Native Hawai-
ian people, and by further promoting 
their culture, heritage, entitlements, 
health, education, and welfare” 
(Hawaii Revised Statutes 2011). In 
her essay in A Nation Rising, Kaua-
nui provided a cogent summary of the 
rationales that led up to this legisla-
tion. She pointed out the inherent 
limitations of the state and federal 
structures for nation building and 
documented the arguments against the 
process of recognition outlined in Act 
195. She recounted the day when the 
legislation was signed into law: “In 
many ways, that historical moment 
marked the depressed culmination of a 
decade of resistance to the Akaka Bill 
and state co-optation of the Hawai-
ian sovereignty struggle” (Kauanui 
2014, 313). These efforts to fold 
Native Hawaiian sovereignty into the 
state and federal governments have 
galvanized Native Hawaiians around 
Hawaiian nationhood. What form 
that nationhood will take has yet to be 
determined.
oha has taken the lead in orga-
nizing the process by which Native 
Hawaiians on the Native Hawaiian 
Roll will establish a Native Hawaiian 
governing unit. In March 2014, oha 
announced that it would facilitate the 
nation-building process but refrain 
from advocating a specific model. 
Trustee Haunani Apoliona, chair of an 
ad hoc governance committee, said, 
“We will remain neutral and ensure 
that the people can provide meaning-
ful input on the process and that the 
outcomes reflect the will of the Native 
Hawaiian people. Simply put, our 
commitment is to provide support by 
letting Native Hawaiians determine 
the desired outcome” (Essoyan 2014).
oha has contracted with Na‘i 
Aupuni to move forward with efforts 
to convene a constitutional convention 
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that would create a Native Hawaiian 
governing entity. According to its web-
site, Na‘i Aupuni is an independent 
organization made up of a volunteer 
board of directors from the Hawaiian 
community. The organization “exists 
solely to help establish a path for 
Hawaiian self-determination.” Na‘i 
Aupuni will facilitate three stages of 
nation building: electing delegates to 
a constitutional convention, building 
a constitution at the convention of 
delegates, and ratifying the constitu-
tion (Na‘i Aupuni website 2015). 
This process is not without contro-
versy. Native Hawaiians are asking 
whether the constitutional conven-
tion will adequately address these 
fundamental questions circulating 
in the Native Hawaiian community: 
Is Hawai‘i a legally constituted state 
of the United States or an occupied 
independent nation? (Sai 2011) and 
How do we protect Native Hawaiian 
entitlement programs at the state and 
federal level? (Apo 2014). These issues 
are too complex to be addressed in 
the abbreviated process outlined by 
Na‘i Aupuni. As Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua 
pointed out, “the scope and complex-
ity of the issues require ‘Ōiwi [Native 
Hawaiians] and settlers to continu-
ously and constructively engage in 
conversations and decision-making 
processes because the problems cannot 
be solved or swept under the rug even 
if full sovereignty, pseudo–sovereign 
government reorganization, or some 
other state-initiated settlement is 
achieved. Like breathing, the work of 
ea [sovereignty] will continue on and 
on” (Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua 2014, 30).
Nevertheless, Na‘i Aupuni con-
tinues on its timeline for an election, 
convention, and ratification process. 
This timeline calls for convening 
an ‘aha (meeting or assembly) on 
O‘ahu between February and April 
2016. The ‘aha is, according to the 
Na‘i Aupuni website, “a gathering 
of elected delegates who will come 
together to decide whether or not to 
create a document or constitution 
for a nation and its governance. Any 
document, constitution or structure 
developed at the ‘Aha may be voted 
upon in a referendum by registered 
Hawaiian voters.” The work of forty 
delegates will be completed over the 
course of eight consecutive weeks 
(forty work days, Monday through 
Friday). If delegates recommend a 
form of Hawaiian government, a 
ratification vote will be held among all 
certified Native Hawaiian voters two 
months after the ‘aha concludes (Na‘i 
Aupuni website 2015).
This is a time of great turmoil and 
great promise for Native Hawai-
ians. A process for establishing a 
Native Hawaiian governing entity 
is moving forward. The protectors 
of Mauna Kea continue their vigil 
on the mountain, and the situation 
remains unresolved. The struggle over 
control of this sacred site, though, 
has strengthened the commitment of 
Native Hawaiian nationals to work 
toward Native Hawaiian control not 
only of Mauna Kea but also of all the 
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Māori Issues 
We lost a number of well-known 
Māori leaders in the past year. Henare 
Rakiihia (Rik) Tau, a Ngāi Tahu 
leader, passed away at the end of June 
2014. He filed the Ngāi Tahu claim 
against the Crown in 1986 and was 
the driving power behind the success-
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government on Māori law and culture 
and served as the Rotorua Lakes 
Council’s director on Māori mat-
ters. We bade each of them a peaceful 
journey as they traveled to rejoin their 
ancestors in far-off Hawaiki.
Leaders of the caliber of these peo-
ple—who spend a great deal of their 
lives in the service of their whānau 
(extended family), hapū (grouping of 
whānau), and iwi (grouping of hapū, 
nation) as well as the wider commu-
nity—are greatly sought after. Most 
often in the Māori world they are 
identified at a young age and trained 
by their elders to take over the mantle 
of leadership at an appropriate time. 
Whakapapa (genealogical) links are 
very important. The English words 
lead and leader are considered inad-
equate descriptors for the role and the 
people we refer to as our rangatira. 
This word provides some insight into 
the role: ranga is a shoal of fish that 
swims in unison; tira is a group of 
people. The derivation raranga is to 
weave. Rangatira are those who weave 
the people together so that they move 
in unison (Mutu 1992, 60). Their 
role has nothing to do with either the 
assertion of power by one (or some) 
over others or notions of hierarchy, 
superiority, and dominance (Mikaere 
2010)—meanings that are inherent 
in the English word leader. Rangatira 
require attributes of integrity, generos-
ity, and humility, the abilities to listen 
to and take the people with them, to 
keep their word, and to enhance the 
mana (power and authority derived 
from the gods) of the people (Dia-
mond 2003). Māori societal values 
including mana, tapu (spiritual power 
or protective force), tikanga (correct 
way of doing things, law), whanau-
ful hearings of the claims and their 
eventual settlement. Amster Reedy, 
a Ngāti Porou leader, passed away 
in September. He was an expert in 
ancient Māori rituals and was called 
on as the kaumātua (expert elder) 
and cultural advisor to New Zealand 
teams for four Olympic games. In 
October, Jonathan Mane-Wheoki, of 
Ngāpuhi, Te Aupōuri, and Ngāti Kurī 
descent, passed away. He was a profes-
sor of fine arts and one of New Zea-
land’s leading art historians. Rāhera 
Barrett-Douglas, Ngāti Maniapoto, 
also passed away in October. She 
led her iwi (nation) as the chair of 
the Ngāti Maniapoto Trust Board in 
the 1990s. In November, it was Eru 
Thompson, a Tainui leader. He was an 
acknowledged and respected historian 
and traditional expert whose knowl-
edge and wisdom were sought after 
throughout Tāmaki Makaurau (Auck-
land). In February 2015, both Apirana 
Mahuika, Ngāti Porou, and Tama 
Huata, Ngāti Kahungunu, joined their 
ancestors. Apirana Mahuika led his 
iwi as chair of Te Rūnanga o Ngāti 
Porou from its establishment in 1987 
until his death. Tama Huata was an 
outstanding leader in Māori perform-
ing arts; he founded the Kahurangi 
Māori Dance Theatre and the Waiata 
Māori Music Awards. In May 2015, 
there was the sudden passing of Erima 
Henare, a Ngāti Hine leader. He was 
an acknowledged expert and authority 
on Māori language, history, traditions, 
genealogies, and laws, particularly in 
Te Tai Tokerau (the North); he was 
also the chair of the Māori  Language 
Commission. Mauriora Kingi, Te 
Arawa, passed away suddenly a 
month later. He was a respected and 
influential advisor of local and central 
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ngatanga (kinship), and rangatira-
tanga (exercise of mana) determine 
how  rangatira conduct themselves and 
carry out their roles.
True rangatira these days are the 
heads of their whānau and hapū. 
Sometimes iwi leaders are rangatira, 
but the imposition of Pākehā (Euro-
pean) legal structures on iwi bodies 
as part of the treaty claims settlement 
process makes it difficult for them to 
adhere to Māori values that define the 
role of a rangatira. Processes imposed 
by these structures for appoint-
ing the organizational leaders favor 
those who have experience in Pākehā 
organizations, particularly government 
departments. Those who are able to 
get around the assimilationist aims of 
these structures are the ones who put 
their people’s needs ahead of Pākehā 
demands, who know and understand 
their people and their whakapapa, 
their customs and traditions, their 
lands and resources, their relation-
ships and obligations to neighboring 
and related whānau, hapū, and iwi; 
how to settle disputes; and how to 
represent their people with pride and 
dignity. They work for little or no 
financial reward, their hours of work 
are endless, and most are only known 
within the Māori world (Knox 2003; 
H Mead and others 2006; A Mead 
1994). 
Part of the colonizing agenda of the 
British was to replace Māori society 
and culture with their own and in 
doing so to assimilate and redefine 
Māori leadership. British histories 
written about early European encoun-
ters with Māori denied the role of 
women as rangatira (Mikaere 2010), 
inflated the status of those rangatira 
who were willing to accede to the 
visitors’ directives (Mutu 2012b, 103), 
and demonized those who put the 
well-being of their people ahead of 
the desires of the foreigners (Henare 
1989). Since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, the British tried either to recruit 
young Māori leaders to retrain them 
or to train young Māori and then 
declare them to be Māori leaders. 
These attitudes and behaviors carry on 
to this day. 
From the outset of the current drive 
to extinguish all Māori claims against 
the British Crown, governments have 
tried to impose their preferred nego-
tiators on iwi entering negotiations 
(Mutu 2005, 201) in an attempt to 
marginalize the rangatira mandated by 
those iwi as negotiators. Where this 
failed, they began incentivizing Māori 
government servants to take over the 
leadership and control of their own 
iwi’s negotiations with the Crown 
and to drive them through to govern-
ment-determined settlements (Mutu 
and others in preparation). Despite 
protests from those iwi about conflicts 
of interest, corruption, and the major 
upheavals that these divide-and-rule 
tactics always cause, the practice has 
become increasingly common (Mutu 
and others in preparation). One of 
the incentives provided to govern-
ment  servants and collaborators is 
the awarding of Queen’s Honours 
to those who achieve settlements—a 
token of the government’s gratitude 
at having been delivered an escape 
route from the astronomical liabilities 
arising from past and ongoing govern-
ment atrocities against Māori. In the 
past two years, no fewer than six such 
awards have been made to iwi negotia-
tors, several of whom are or have been 
government servants (Department of 
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the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015; 
Waatea News 2014).
Government-appointed Māori 
leaders often have a high media and 
public profile, but they are most often 
“leaders of non-Māori organisations 
in the non-Māori world” (Knox 2003, 
2). They adopt a style of leadership 
that eschews traditional Māori values, 
imposes hierarchical notions of supe-
riority and dominance, and mimics 
British societal values of the right 
of individuals to personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property. 
This prioritizes the pursuit of mon-
etary and material gain and political 
power. The government has been at 
pains to emphasize the monetary value 
of settlements it achieves with Māori 
and the opportunity of increased 
political influence for Māori that may 
result from them (Stone 2012, 140). 
It is careful to avoid any discussion 
on the legislative extinguishment of 
Māori sovereignty, ownership, and 
human rights that settlements deliver 
for governments and that many claim-
ants are far more concerned about 
(Mutu 2012a). 
The composition and work of the 
National Iwi Chairs’ Forum is an 
example of the dynamics involved 
when true rangatira and government-
favored leaders attempt to work 
together. The forum is an informal 
but highly organized group of the 
chairpersons of sixty-seven organiza-
tions from around the country, each 
mandated to represent their iwi in 
some capacity (National Iwi Chairs 
Forum 2015). Almost all its members 
are men. It was established in 2005 
and, while the Labour government 
refused to recognize the group, the 
National Party–led government has 
worked with the forum since 2008 at 
the behest of their coalition partner, 
the Māori Party. Government attempts 
to attribute the representation of all 
Māori to the forum have been firmly 
rejected. There is no body that holds 
such a mandate. The government’s 
aspiration has always been to control 
the forum, but the forum has been res-
olute in maintaining its independence 
from the government. Government 
persistence, however, has necessitated 
repeated reminders of the need for 
vigilance in this respect. 
A significant number of the mem-
bers of the forum can be classified 
as true rangatira: people who have 
worked selflessly for the whānau, 
hapū, and iwi, fighting government 
oppression and denial of their rights, 
often for many decades, and who 
have been appointed by their people 
as their leaders and spokespersons in 
accordance with traditional tikanga 
(correct ways of doing things; law). 
Countering that are members who 
have achieved their positions as iwi 
chairpersons through government-
imposed structures using processes 
derived from British culture. There is 
widespread criticism of many of these 
structures, especially from the hapū 
whom they disempower. This criticism 
has carried over into the forum (Sykes 
2010). At least several iwi chairper-
sons are government loyalists, and a 
significant number of these are or have 
been government servants. 
The National Iwi Chairs’ Forum 
has a number of working groups that 
carry out work in particular areas 
such as constitutional transforma-
tion (Mutu 2015, 276); fresh water; 
climate change; foreshore and seabed 
conservation; the recovery of lands 
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and resources including oil and miner-
als; housing; and economic develop-
ment. One or more iwi chairpersons 
lead each group. A number of tech-
nicians and experts in the various 
fields (working largely voluntarily or 
funded by iwi organizations) carry 
out research, ascertain the views of 
whānau and hapū throughout the 
country, and draft reports for presen-
tation at the quarterly forum meetings. 
Chairpersons with government-servant 
backgrounds tend to target the groups 
that allow them to interact with 
government ministers and officials. 
Their work is then seriously compro-
mised when, for example, they seek 
ministerial approval for their reports 
prior to delivering them to the forum 
(National Iwi Chairs’ Forum 2014). 
The prime minister and a number of 
ministers of Parliament are occasion-
ally invited to quarterly meetings of 
the forum but only to answer specific 
questions. Unresolved problems within 
and between iwi sometimes surface 
in forum meetings, although tikanga 
has prevailed with responsibility for 
the problem being returned to the iwi 
concerned. It is the traditional ranga-
tira who lead discussion and steer the 
forum.
Unresolved problems within 
the country’s largest iwi, Ngāpuhi, 
continued to attract media attention 
throughout the reporting period. 
Government support for its preferred 
leader and negotiating body and its 
attempts to bulldoze through a settle-
ment while the Waitangi Tribunal was 
still hearing the claims (Mutu 2015, 
279) resulted in the Waitangi Tribunal 
granting an urgent hearing concerning 
the mandating process. In its decision 
to do so, it noted “that relationships 
within Ngāpuhi have been seriously 
damaged by the mandating process . . .
the Crown has pre-determined the 
outcome by ‘picking a winner’ and 
backing the winner through fund-
ing. . . . This has resulted in a ‘win-
ner and loser’ dynamic which has led 
to the break-down of relationships 
within Ngāpuhi” (Jones 2014b, 41).
Problems with the settlement 
process were reported in a number 
of areas. These included reports of 
disenfranchised claimants trying 
to stop settlements for Te Atiawa, 
Ngāruahine, Rangitāne ki Manawatū, 
Tūhoe, Te Hiku o Te Ika, and Te 
Aitanga a Māhaki. In Taranaki, there 
was protest at the exclusion of the 
Pekapeka block in Waitara from Te 
Atiawa’s settlement, and the Arau-
kuku hapū unsuccessfully sought 
an urgent hearing in the Waitangi 
Tribunal to prevent their claim from 
being extinguished in the Ngāruahine 
settlement (Waitangi Tribunal 2015). 
In Manawatū, there was protest over 
the mandate of the body settling the 
Rangitāne ki Manawatū claims. In 
the central North Island, the Tūhoe 
settlement was hailed as remarkable 
in many ways.  Its removal of Crown 
ownership and national park status 
from the extensive Te Urewera hill 
country was described as ground-
breaking (Jones 2014a). However, it 
fell short of recognizing Tūhoe owner-
ship. Several hapū whose claims are 
extinguished by the settlement without 
being addressed sought to stop its pas-
sage through Parliament (Māori Tele-
vision 2014). In the Far North, Ngāti 
Kahu told the Māori Affairs Select 
Committee to stop the passage of the 
Te Hiku Claims Settlement Bill, which 
excludes them from large areas of 
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their lands by vesting them exclusively 
in the neighboring iwi (Radio New 
Zealand 2015a). In the same hearing, 
four of the five Ngāi Takoto marae 
protested about being excluded from 
the Ngāi Takoto settlement (Te Hiku 
Media 2015). On the East Coast, 
Mangatū Incorporation was successful 
in its application to the High Court to 
quash the Waitangi Tribunal decision 
not to give them binding recommenda-
tions over the Mangatū blocks. The 
government wanted to use these lands 
to settle Te Aitanga a Māhaki’s claim 
(High Court of New Zealand 2015). 
Ngāti Kahu took a similar case and 
are awaiting the court’s decision. It is 
inevitable that the government, which 
is desperate to retain its stranglehold 
on the settlement process, will appeal 
any decision that could lead to the 
tribunal making binding recommenda-
tions that order it to return lands it 
has stolen from Māori.
Meanwhile, problems were also 
being reported for iwi who have 
settled but are having difficulty hold-
ing the government to the terms of 
their settlements. Ngāi Tahu reported 
having their rights of first refusal to 
Crown land breached many times 
(Sherman 2015). Tainui and Ngāti 
Whātua are heading to the High 
Court over the government’s denial 
of their rights of first refusal to land 
in Auckland (Radio New Zealand 
2015b). Despite this, the government 
continues to maximize its revenues 
from the settlement process, as iwi use 
income generated from the settlements 
along with funds borrowed, usually 
from overseas, to purchase lands the 
government stole from them. In June 
2015, Ngāti Tūwharetoa announced 
that they were paying the government 
nz$20 million for 8,500 hectares of 
land “being returned by the Crown 
who stole it long ago” (McLean 
2015b). 
In the face of widespread dissatis-
faction and protest against the settle-
ments, the government has remained 
resolute in its drive to extinguish 
all treaty claims. It is determined to 
legislate away the serious flaws the 
Waitangi Tribunal has identified in the 
assumptions it makes about its own 
power and authority. This includes 
the false claims it makes to the lands 
and resources of whānau and hapū 
throughout the country in order to 
deliver privilege and prosperity to 
those who came and settled here as 
a result of the 1840 treaty, Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi, mainly from England. In 
2014, it passed legislation extinguish-
ing all the historical claims of Tūhoe 
in the Central North Island, Ngāti 
Hauā and Ngāti Koroki Kahukura of 
Waikato-Tainui, and the shared inter-
ests of the Tāmaki Makaurau Collec-
tive of the Auckland region. 
In the same year the tribunal issued 
a report confirming that Māori did 
not cede their sovereignty in 1840 
(Waitangi Tribunal 2014). Pākehā 
have always asserted that our Māori 
ancestors ceded our sovereignty to 
the British when we signed Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi in 1840. We have always 
said they didn’t. English settlers relied 
on this falsehood to provide the justi-
fication for their claim to power and 
control over this country through their 
parliamentary and judicial system. In 
doing so they wove a complex tapestry 
of myths about Māori and about their 
own supremacy, which the tribunal 
carefully unraveled in its report. 
Government reaction was instan-
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taneous; they dismissed the report, 
baldly asserting that “the Crown has 
sovereignty in New Zealand” (Chap-
man 2014). However, the report 
was widely reported nationally and 
internationally. The Telegraph in 
London referred to it as “the histori-
cal bombshell” (Chapman 2014). The 
Māori world was ecstatic. Shock 
waves spread through the Pākehā 
settler community. A number of hui 
(gatherings) have been held since the 
publication of the report to discuss its 
 implications. For many, it gave even 
greater urgency to the work of the 
group of constitutional specialists, 
Matike Mai Aotearoa, who have been 
drawing up models for a constitu-
tion for the country based on tikanga 
(Māori law) and the two documents 
that were the subject of the Tribu-
nal’s inquiry, He Whakaputanga o Te 
Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (the 1835 
declaration of Māori sovereignty and 
independence) and Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
(the Māori-language treaty between 
Māori and the queen of England) 
(Mutu 2015, 276).
As the myth of the supreme and 
indivisible sovereignty of Parliament 
unravels, expectations of parliamen-
tary members of Māori descent are 
becoming more realistic. Some may 
enter the Pākehā Parliament as ranga-
tira, but that role is quickly under-
mined by the demands of an institu-
tion established to service the needs 
of Pākehā. That frequently involves 
passing legislation that removes the 
rights of Māori, such as the legisla-
tion related to the foreshore and 
seabed and treaty claims settlements 
or extinguishments (Mutu 2011). 
The September 2014 general election 
results indicated that no fewer than 
twenty-six members of Parliament of 
Māori descent are now in the House, 
with all but two spread across the four 
main parties: National, Labour, the 
Greens and New Zealand First. These 
members owe allegiance to their par-
ties first, not to Māori. There are only 
seven members (in a 120-seat Parlia-
ment) who are specifically mandated 
to represent Māori in Parliament. 
However, even they must put their 
party’s wishes ahead of the needs of 
their constituents. Six of the seven 
Māori seats contested in the election 
went to Labour, with the seventh 
going to the Māori Party, which also 
gained a list member of Parliament. 
Once again the Māori Party joined the 
National Party–led coalition govern-
ment. Experience has shown that, 
while this allows them a place in the 
cabinet, it does severely constrain their 
ability to be an independent voice 
for Māori in Parliament. The Mana 
Party’s one member was not returned, 
so there are now no independent 
Māori voices in the House. Māori 
voter turnout of 67 percent (65% in 
the Māori seats) continued to be much 
lower than the overall turnout of 77 
percent (Electoral Commission 2014).
One area in which the Māori Party 
did manage to achieve some gains 
was its Whānau Ora (well families) 
initiative. It aims to revolutionize 
the way government social services 
are delivered to Māori by having all 
services focus on the needs of whānau 
(extended family) rather than the 
needs of multiple uncoordinated 
government agencies. Its goal is to 
empower whānau to take control of 
their own well-being (Turia 2011) 
and to deliberately move away from 
the deficit model, problem-focused 
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approach used unsuccessfully on 
Māori by government agencies for 
many decades. In doing so, Whānau 
Ora aims to remove the industrial-
ized misery under which Māori suffer 
and from which many Pākehā social 
welfare providers prosper and instead 
empower Māori to direct and control 
our own welfare systems.
The initiative had a number of 
teething problems caused mainly by 
government departments withholding 
resources and refusing to relinquish 
control. As a result, the Māori Party 
moved the initiative out of the govern-
ment and set up three community-
based commissioning agencies whose 
role is to allocate resources to Māori 
and Pacific Island–based providers 
who deliver directly to whānau. A 
report by Auditor-General Lyn Provost 
released in May 2015 concluded 
that Whānau Ora had been a success 
for many families despite the small 
amount the government has spent on 
it (Provost 2015, 4). However, she 
was very critical of the government 
departments involved in delivery of 
the program, noting that nearly a third 
of the total spending was on admin-
istration when it should have gone to 
whānau and their providers (Provost 
2015, 4–5). Provost also noted a reluc-
tance in government agencies to even 
consider moving away from models 
that have failed in the past in order to 
implement the Whānau Ora initiative 
(2015, 5). Entrenched racism in the 
public service means that Māori initia-
tives often fail because they are sabo-
taged by bureaucrats. The auditor-
general concluded that “an innovative 
idea should not be abandoned just 
because of implementation problems” 
(Provost 2015, 5), and moving it away 
from the public service has been an 
innovation that many Māori commu-
nities have welcomed.
While Māori representation at 
the national level is provided for in 
Parliament, in local and regional 
government it is left to the discretion 
of the council. Some councils have 
permitted Māori to participate, but 
others have rejected repeated requests 
to do so. Pākehā determination to 
exclude Māori from decision-making 
roles turned ugly in New Plymouth, 
Rotorua, Papakura, Tauranga, and 
the Far North. In New Plymouth, the 
district council voted to allow Māori 
representation, but the response from 
the majority Pākehā population was 
vicious. They campaigned vigorously 
against Māori inclusion and eventually 
forced a referendum, which over-
turned the council’s decision (Tuuta 
2015). In Rotorua, an equally deter-
mined attempt to keep Māori out of 
the Rotorua Lakes Council was not as 
successful, with councillors accepting 
an arrangement that was described by 
a Te Arawa spokesperson as a start 
but far from perfect (Maoate-Cox 
2015). In Papakura, Tauranga, and 
the Far North, superficial attempts to 
consider Māori representation resulted 
in each proposal being rejected.
Battles to protect Māori natural 
resources continued around the coun-
try throughout the year. Both the New 
Zealand Māori Council and National 
Iwi Chairs Forum are continuing to 
fight to have the government recog-
nize and acknowledge Māori owner-
ship of water. Protests against mining 
licenses issued for oil drilling off the 
south Taranaki bight and off both the 
east and the west coasts are ongo-
ing. A delegation from iwi of the Far 
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North visited the Sami Parliament 
in Norway and attended the annual 
general meeting of the offending oil 
company, Statoil, in a bid to stop them 
desecrating an area sacred to those 
iwi (Mike Smith, pers comm, 25 May 
2015). Following strong objections 
from Māori, the New Zealand Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency refused 
to give consents for sand mining in 
south Taranaki and for phosphate 
mining on the Chatham Rise. The 
battle continued to force the owners 
to remove the ship Rena, which was 
wrecked on Ōtaiti (Astrolabe Reef) 
off Mōtītī island in the Bay of Plenty 
in 2011 (Mutu 2013, 168), with the 
owners offering financial inducements 
for Māori to withdraw their objec-
tions (McLean 2015a). And in North-
land, Ngāti Manu were appalled at a 
decision to grant a consent to expand 
the marina in the picturesque Bay of 
Islands. The existing Ōpua marina 
has already severely polluted Ngāti 
Manu’s Taumārere River (Nathan 
2014).
On a brighter note, the Māori films 
The Dead Lands, The Dark Horse, 
and What We Do in the Shadows 
have been doing well in international 
film festivals. The Dark Horse won 
an award for Best Film at the Seattle 
International Film Festival, with Cliff 
Curtis (Te Arawa) named Best Actor 
(Māori Television 2015). And Lisa 
Carrington (Te Aitanga a Māhaki, 
Ngāti Porou), paddler extraordinaire, 
won her fifth World Cup gold medal 
in as many races. Lisa has dominated 
world championships and the Olym-
pics in flat-water canoeing since 2014 
(Balvert 2014).
margaret mutu
The author has been a member of 
the National Iwi Chairs’ Forum since 
its inception in 2005. Her comments 
on the forum in this review are based 
on her observations of its operations 
over the past decade. 
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Rapa Nui
Rapa Nui politics during the review 
period centered on the reclamation 
of ancestral territories that Chile had 
developed into a national park in 
1935 without notifying or consult-
ing Rapa Nui. A 2003 national truth 
commission on Chile’s indigenous 
peoples had recommended return of 
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and mismanagement, marine resource 
destruction, and a range of energy 
failures (Campbell 2006). While recent 
government statistics registered over 
92,000 tourist visits to the island in 
2013 (El Correo Del Moai, Oct 2014), 
during the review period the Chilean 
state continued to pursue develop-
ment projects that will expand tourism 
even further beyond the 2003 unesco 
recommendations of di Castri. 
Three development proposals are 
most noteworthy. During October 
2014, Chilean President Michelle 
Bachelet announced an approximately 
us$160 million plan for infrastruc-
tural changes to the island airport 
(including a second runway), docking, 
irrigation, power, and sewage systems 
to begin in 2015 and be completed by 
2020 (gi, 20 Oct 2014). In strong sup-
port, island Mayor Petero Edmunds 
emphasized that the projects were 
necessary for maintaining the island 
like a “Rolls Royce”—a goal he con-
ceived as having immeasurable value 
for Chile’s “image” (lt, 17 Oct 2014). 
In December, Edmunds announced 
an additional plan to build a shop-
ping mall on the island. The project 
proposes to develop a four-hectare 
plot of land containing some of the 
world-famous moai statues within 
the municipality of Hanga Roa into a 
mall with multiple retail stores. The 
mayor called for a partnership with 
billionaire German-Chilean entrepre-
neur Horst Paulmann, chief executive 
officer and chairman of the Cencosud 
Corporation, reportedly “one of the 
largest and most prestigious retail 
conglomerates in Latin America” 
(Cencosud 2015). While the project 
would require the displacement of 
some of the moai for mall construc-
the “park lands” to Rapa Nui along 
with all island territory (Gobierno de 
Chile 2008, 570), but this was never 
realized under the subsequent neolib-
eral presidency of Sebastián Piñera. 
The reclamation efforts reflect an 
intensification of Rapa Nui pursuit of 
their international indigenous human 
rights to self-determination in the face 
of statecraft that continues to fore-
ground the development of economic 
growth threatening Rapa Nui culture, 
island ecology, and livelihood. Under 
the guidance of Ariki Valentino Riro 
Kainga (appointed king of Rapa Nui 
in 2011 and descendant of the last 
Rapa Nui king, Riro), the leadership 
of Parlamento Rapa Nui President 
Leviante Araki and Vice President Eriti 
Teave is distinguished in this review of 
the conflict and the broader context of 
the events of the year.
As expansion of the tourism indus-
try in Rapa Nui has intensified annu-
ally since the turn of the millennium, 
questions of sustainability have been 
constant. The late unesco assistant 
director general, Francesco di Castri, 
worried about the sustainability of 
tourism at the beginning of the new 
millennium, when he estimated 20,000 
visitors as the maximum carrying 
capacity of the island (di Castri 2003, 
45). He noted that this number had 
already been exceeded in 1990 when 
visitors climbed to 21,000 and by 
2005 had reached 45,000 (Gonschor 
2007, 244). Australian ecologist Petra 
Campbell echoed di Castri’s concerns 
with a 2004 study that projected 
current tourist development as likely 
to result in an “environmental catas-
trophe” that would involve future 
aquifer contamination, continued land 
degradation from long-term erosion 
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tion, Edmunds promised coordination 
of moai movement by the Chilean 
National Monument Council, utiliz-
ing the most advanced technology in 
the world (ec, 28 Dec 2014). Rather 
than address projected aquifer con-
tamination, in June 2015 the Chilean 
National Corporation of Forestry 
(conaf) announced a plan to build 
a desalinization plant for agricultural 
development. Carolina Cuevas (who 
is, ironically, the head of a Chilean 
sustainability foundation) emphasized 
that the new desalinization technology 
will provide more water to help local 
farmers realize new economic oppor-
tunities (Parque Nacional Rapa Nui, 
25 June 2015). 
State plans to restructure the island 
ecology, infrastructure, and material 
culture to intensify economic growth 
are being coordinated with programs 
to develop Rapa Nui subjectivity 
in terms of the principles of “homo 
oeconomicus” that are increasingly 
dominant in the era of global neo-
liberal rationality (Brown 2015, 33). 
As part of Chile’s broader tourism 
investment plan, the state has begun 
to develop Rapa Nui chapters of 
national programs for the training of 
entrepreneurs (gi, 19 Nov 2014). The 
plan is designed to encourage Rapa 
Nui youth to start their own busi-
nesses under the Solidarity and Social 
Investment Fund (fosis) programs 
that Director Marcelo Aguilar hopes 
will establish a “permanent presence” 
on the island (gi, 30 Sept 2014). 
Apparently anticipating conflict, the 
development projects and programs 
have been accompanied by indigenous 
conflict-resolution classes for state 
workers in various government offices 
and institutions (gi, 4 Nov 2014). 
In the context of acts of resistance 
by leaders of the Rapa Nui nation 
during the land reclamations of 2015, 
as well as three other significant 
events, state development plans for 
transformation of the island infra-
structure and Rapa Nui subjectivi-
ties for the production of economic 
growth and a “Rolls Royce” Chilean 
image appear entangled in a “battle-
order”  (Foucault 1980, 16). The 9th 
of September is the annual day of 
recognition of the 1888 signing of the 
“Acuerdo de Voluntades” (Agreement 
of Wills) between Chile and Rapa Nui. 
While the state used to honor that 
day with ceremonies and parades on 
the island, Rapa Nui demonstrations 
and marches have become an island 
norm since state  violence against Rapa 
Nui movements for self-determination 
began in 2010 (see Young 2012a, 
2012b). In 2014 the 9th of September 
was “dis-honored” by three differ-
ent events organized by the Rapa Nui 
leadership: a march down main street 
with Rapa Nui national flags and 
banners protesting the state; a politi-
cal demonstration at the King Riro 
Plaza Civic Center—the site of the 
prior state celebrations; and another 
political demonstration in front of the 
Hotel Hangaroa Eco Village and Spa 
(ec, 9 Sept 2014). In general, the orga-
nizers emphasized that all the issues 
related to their demands for self-deter-
mination in 2010 remain “valid given 
the lack of response of successive gov-
ernments” (Cooperativa, 9 Sept 2014). 
In addition, demonstrators emphasized 
that they marched in protest of state 
development policies that are seen as 
destroying the island. Petero Cardinali, 
supporting full political independence 
of Rapa Nui, emphasized that Chilean 
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policies are unsustainable and “filling 
the island with garbage,” while Wilo 
Teao expressed fear that Rapa Nui 
would become “extinct” as a result of 
“uncontrolled development” destroy-
ing the island (La Colmena, 13 Sept 
2014). At the hotel demonstration, 
Rapa Nui children held banners with 
slogans like “la gran estafa” (the 
great hoax), with images of the hotel 
presented in black covered with red 
blood–stained moai statues (ec, 9 Sept 
2014), and Hitorangi family members 
installed black flags around the front 
of the hotel in defiance of armed Chil-
ean police, who stand guard twenty-
four hours a day against new occupa-
tions of the hotel by the Hitorangi 
family (Cooperativa, 9 Sept 2014). 
As 2014 ended and the New 
Year emerged, two additional events 
illuminated deepening resistance to 
the state’s expansion plans. In late 
November 2014, Rapa Nui national 
identification cards premiered on 
the island with the support of Rafael 
“Rinko” Tuki, the leading Rapa Nui 
representative of the Chilean National 
Corporation for the Development of 
Indigenous Peoples. The cards code 
personal information in the Rapa Nui 
language, and at the top of the cards 
is a national identification of “Hau” 
(nation) Maori Rapa Nui. Rinko 
Tuki emphasized that the cards are 
intended as an expression of Rapa Nui 
“terri torial sovereignty and the right 
to self-determination” in accordance 
with instruments of international law 
such as International Labor Orga-
nization (ilo) Convention 169 and 
United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions 1514 and 1541 (ec, 8 Jan 
2015). On 26 January 2015, lead-
ers of the Rapa Nui nation organized 
against a newly created state Ministry 
of Indigenous Affairs, which leaders 
claimed was constructed without their 
consultation, in violation of ilo Con-
vention 169 (ec, 27 Jan 2015). Petero 
Fati, a Rapa Nui lawyer and part of 
the political organization against the 
ministry, stressed that the state’s hand-
picked representatives reflected an 
operational pattern of “fraudulence” 
by the Chilean government in island 
indigenous affairs (Mapu Express, 
1 Feb 2015). 
In late March 2015, dialogues 
between leaders of Te Hau Maori 
Rapa Nui and representatives of the 
state of Chile collapsed. Consequently, 
representatives of the Rapa Nui nation 
shut down the Chilean-administered 
national park of Easter Island on 
26 March (Save Rapa Nui, 28 March 
2015). The major access roads to the 
park were blocked by felled trees and 
Rapa Nui bodies, organized in part 
through the leadership of Leviante 
Araki and Erity Teave of Parlamento 
Rapa Nui; approximately thirty Rapa 
Nui people were posted at three major 
tourist access points (lt, 29 March 
2015). Signs re-territorialized the park 
tourist sites as “propiedad ances-
tral” (ancestral property) (Biobio, 
15 April 2015). In response to the 
arrival of state riot police as well as 
new dialogues with Chilean govern-
ment authorities, roadblocks were 
reduced and tourist access to the 
ancestral properties increased between 
29 March and 1 April, and tourists 
were granted access after registering 
with the Parlamento Rapa Nui central 
office or with on-site coordinators. 
However, guides and tour operators 
who were not of Rapa Nui ancestry, 
or with no marital ties to Rapa Nui 
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people, were denied access (Easter 
Island blog, 6 April 2015).
Weeks of constant marches, pro-
tests, and ten-hour-long dialogues 
between Rapa Nui leaders and 
representatives of political offices, 
councils, and ministries determined by 
the  Chilean government—including 
the Chilean Ministry of Defense— 
followed the land reclamations (lt, 
14 April 2015). Chilean officials and 
media stressed concern about the 
impact of the reclamations on the 
tourism industry (Noticias Terra, 
28 March 2015) and tended to rep-
resent the reclamations as responding 
to state failures to establish laws for 
controlling Chilean migration to Rapa 
Nui as well as disagreements over 
the proper management of the park 
(lt, 14 April 2015). Mayor Edmunds 
blamed state failures to finalize migra-
tion laws on the Chilean Ministry of 
Interior (lt, 29 March 2015), but he 
felt that the disputes over the manage-
ment of the park were tractable with 
additional meetings and “streamlin-
ing” of the government (Noticias 
Terra, 29 March 2015). The state thus 
portrayed the conflict as a technical 
problem that could be resolved with 
moderate reform and management of 
the current system of Chilean gover-
nance on the island under the terms of 
new Chilean laws.
Rapa Nui national leaders agreed 
that the reclamations were in part 
a response to state failures to final-
ize laws to restrict Chilean migration 
to the island (lt, 14 April 2015); 
however, the reclamations were also 
articulated in terms of a more robust 
historical, political, and spiritual 
sensibility. Christian Moreno Pakarati, 
an indigenous Rapa Nui historian at 
the University of Chile, foregrounding 
the  reclamations as strongly supported 
by the overwhelming majority of the 
Rapa Nui people, highlighted their 
validity in terms of the aforementioned 
1888 Agreement of Wills between 
Rapa Nui and Chilean representatives. 
He conceived of current actions of 
Rapa Nui leadership as being con-
sistent with over a century of Rapa 
Nui resistance to a Chilean order 
in violation of the agreement and 
unsustainably threatening the future 
of Rapa Nui culture, ecology, lan-
guage, and people (University of Chile 
website, 13 April 2015). Focused more 
on recent history, Anakena Manu-
tomatoma, a member of the state-
based Rapa Nui development council, 
the Commission for the Development 
of Easter Island (codeipa), framed 
the reclamations as a continuation of 
the Rapa Nui political “awakening” 
that she traced to 2010 when the state 
“shot people” (lt, 14 April 2015). 
Emphasizing that the state “contin-
ues to act as colonizers,” Eriti Teave 
stressed that the reclamations should 
be understood as an exercise of their 
“inalienable rights” as an indigenous 
people (lt, 15 April 2015). Similarly, 
Santi Hitorangi, Parlamento Rapa 
Nui member and regular leader of 
the Rapa Nui nation at the United 
Nations (see Young 2015a), consis-
tently represented the event as first 
and foremost an exercise of Rapa 
Nui rights to self-determination (Save 
Rapa Nui, 12 April 2015). 
Analysis of the language of the 
re-territorialized signs illustrates that 
the reclamations are not motivated 
by strictly economic and political 
considerations. Local Rapa Nui–deter-
mined media refer to the territory 
242 the contemporary pacific • 28:1 (2016)
reclaimed not in terms of state tour-
ist discourse that calls it a national 
park, but in Rapa Nui language 
terms such as “Hauha‘a Tupuna” 
and “Kainga Ariki” of “Te Pito o Te 
Henua” (ec, 21 May 2015). The last 
term, “Te Pito o Te Henua,” is an 
alternative name for the island itself, 
and, importantly, contains the word 
henua, that is roughly translated as 
“island” yet retains the Rapa Nui 
concept of  placenta, derived from 
the ancient Proto-Polynesian term 
fanua (Kirch and Green 2001, 103). 
The second term, “Kainga Ariki” 
can be roughly translated as “chiefly 
lands,” but the word kainga retains 
the Rapa Nui worldview of womb or 
uterus (Huki 1988, 10), which con-
founds English translation as merely 
“land.” The first term, “Hauha‘a 
Tupuna,” can be roughly translated as 
“ancestral valuables,” which include 
the world-famous moai statues. Yet 
from a Rapa Nui perspective, moai 
are not simply aesthetically enchant-
ing monuments, as tourists may see 
them. Each Rapa Nui family member 
traces their ancestry to specific ahu 
(ceremonial centers) where moai are 
placed. Moai honor deceased chiefs of 
family lineages; in other words, Rapa 
Nui consider moai to be “spiritual 
tombstones” that “protect the land 
and the blood matrix to which each 
clan belongs” (Hitorangi 2013). These 
conceptualizations are not simply 
cultural memories but are enacted in 
contemporary spiritual ceremonies 
and everyday Rapa Nui discursive 
practices (see Young 2015b). Thus, 
while Rapa Nui do emphasize the 
more technical issues of migration in 
discussing the conflict, ultimately the 
indigenous politics articulate with a 
spiritual ecology that grounds Rapa 
Nui epistemological and ontological 
life in their own ancestral heritage and 
worldview. Hence, for Leviante Araki, 
the reclamations are first and foremost 
about a desire to “protect our ances-
tral property and ancestral lands” and 
initiate a process that will enable their 
governance to “pass into the hands 
of our people” (El Mercurio Online, 
19 April 2015).
On 15 April, an agreement was 
reached regarding the ancestral terri-
tory reclaimed by leaders of the Rapa 
Nui nation and representatives of the 
Chilean government. There are twelve 
signatories to the document, including 
three representatives of the Chilean 
government and nine representatives 
from six different indigenous institu-
tions in support of the Rapa Nui 
nation. Four points of agreement were 
distinguished in the document: (1) that 
administration of the territory of the 
“Rapa Nui National Park,” includ-
ing rights to all ceremonial sites and 
ancestral usage, would be transferred 
to an autonomous body of the Rapa 
Nui people; (2) that contemporary 
care of the park would remain in the 
hands of the Rapa Nui people while 
the transfer was in process; (3) that 
Parlamento Rapa Nui would respect 
the free movement of people within 
the park during the transfer; and 
(4) that a formal proposal for admin-
istration of the park would be con-
structed within the framework of ilo 
169 within sixty days.
As the period in review came to 
a close, a formal proposal had not 
materialized, and the meaning of the 
conflict, the initial resolution, and the 
ultimate goals remain disputed and 
circumscribed by political tension 
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(Radio University of Chile, 17 July 
2015). On 10 June 2015, Parlamento 
Rapa Nui issued statements to Chil-
ean President Bachelet, as well as to 
international political institutions 
such as the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States, 
reporting police intimidation strate-
gies as representatives of the Rapa 
Nui nation controlled access to the 
ancestral properties visited by tourists 
and continued to organize leadership 
for self-determination in accordance 
with the April 2015 agreement. In 
July and August, state intimidation 
escalated to include police arrests of 
Rapa Nui national leaders Mario Tuki 
and Leviante Araki (Parque Nacional 
de Rapa Nui, 15 Aug 2015) and a 
police “break-in” (allanamiento) of 
Parlamento Rapa Nui offices, against 
the will of the organization leaders 
(Pakarati 2015). 
Thomas Friedman famously 
anticipated globalization would be 
frequently punctuated with conflicts 
between investors hoping to develop 
economic growth by building the next 
fancy “Lexus” and world peoples 
struggling to retain or regain the 
“olive trees” of their cultural identity 
and belonging (2000). Perhaps fearing 
that the newly planted “olive tree” of 
the Rapa Nui nation will stand in the 
way of their proposed multimillion 
dollar shopping mall and infrastruc-
ture projects, the Rapa Nui Lexus 
investors—or in Mayor Edmunds’s 
phrase, the “Rolls Royce” dealers—
have more fight left in them; one can 
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